Introduction
This paper analyses the factors and possible processes that determine the levels of perceived corruption in a nation on a global level. It begins by examining three definitions of corruption by Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) , who choose a definition according to Western standards; Sandholtz and Gray (2003) , who argue that international norms define corruption as simply "the misuse of public office for private gain"; and Montinola and Jackman (2002) , who avoid the argument over definitions by taking a somewhat anthropological approach, noting differences and their effects, but making no attempt to integrate these differences into a compatible basis for global study. This study approaches the global definition of corruption as a problem involving elite and non-elite perceptions in world opinion. The paper uses the 2006 International Social Survey to derive a corruption scale based on individual perceptions; it then generates four factors that predict the perceived mean levels of corruption in the society using means from the nations in the study. Finally, the paper analyzes the relationship between these factors and the Global  This paper first was prepared for presentation at the International Political Science Conference; Madrid, Spain; July 9, 2012 Integrity Report and Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index" (CPI) and the ranking of the nations studied on the CPI to test whether the factors predict the CPI scores and rankings. It is discovered that while the corruption scale does predict the CPI scores and rankings, the other factors primarily affect them insofar as they relate to the corruption scale. However, the CPI and the rankings, when combined with the four factors, have separate effects upon the perceived level of corruption in the society. The paper concludes with two hypotheses: either the national level of corruption perceived by citizens is a mixture of "top-down" (or elite) and "bottomup" (or citizen) perceptions, or the two sets of measures are negotiated by citizens to yield the level of perceived corruption nationally. Either way, the results suggest the CPI index alone cannot measure the levels and meanings of national corruption levels globally.
Participating in a globalized economy raises issues of how to define corruption, given that one society's corrupt practices might be another society's standard and accepted behavior1. This paper argues that corruption must be understood and defined according to a combination of elite-generated international standards and global survey results.
Several approaches have been used to define corruption for multinational studies. In some cases, a definition is chosen according to Western standards and understandings of the relations between public and private sectors. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) argue that there are three elements of a "core definition of corruption"; they include a distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere… a recognition that corrupt acts involve an exchange, in which one party offers inducements (frequently but not necessarily monetary) to a
The authors later argue that corruption "refers to practices that are considered improper under Western norms" (ibid.:36) and that one can apply Western norms to non-Western societies without fear of distorting the analysis (ibid.:35). This approach is not only ethnocentric; it also gives few clues regarding what non-Western nations might consider corruption, and how this might be reconciled with other definitions when one is working in the context of a global economy. Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue that international norms define corruption as simply "the misuse of public office for private gain" 3 (Sandholtz and Gray, 2003: 765) . While "international norms" imply a role for world opinion in defining corruption, they offer little empirical evidence to support their definition. Instead, they argue that different international organizations produce a global understanding of the term: "The result of the activities of these IOs and NGOs has been the creation of a rudimentary anticorruption regime, embodied in international agreements (such as the OAS and OECD conventions) and in the operating policies and practices of IOs such as the World Bank and the IMF" (ibid.:774). It is unclear whether, or how, such norms penetrate below the global elite level to the populations and political actors within individual nations. Further, the existence of organizations and agreements do not necessarily herald the existence of measurable values, a problem made more acute by the authors' claim that these values predated the very existence of the organizations designed to reify and enforce them globally.
Montinola and Jackman (2002) avoid the argument over definitions by taking a somewhat anthropological approach, noting differences among societies and their effects. However, they make no attempt to integrate these differences into a compatible basis for global study4. This paper argues that using international elite opinion combined with global survey results allows the researcher to avoid some of the above problems without abandoning the search for global patterns for the definition of corruption. It combines ratings from the "Corruption Perceptions Index" (CPI) generated primarily from surveys of business elites and experts from various organizations around the world with global surveys of citizens' views on corruption. The CPI focuses primarily upon questions of whether public officials are using their offices for private gain, and upon the business climate in different nations; the international surveys focus upon citizen perceptions of the level of corruption in their society and the factors that predict them.
What follows proceeds in four parts. The first examines different definitions of corruption and discusses how these definitions may be operationalized for quantitative analysis. The second performs this analysis on individual-level data on corruption from the 2006 International Social Survey; the percentage of the variance in defining corruption explained here is fairly low. The third deals with national-level data, using the means values of national independent variables to define mean corruption scores for countries. This measure explains higher levels of variance in the perceived level of corruption in the society. Finally, the paper analyzes the relationship between these factors and the Global Integrity Report and Transparency International's "Corruption Perception Index" (CPI) and the ranking of the nations studied on the CPI to test whether the factors predict the CPI scores and rankings. It is discovered that while the corruption scale does predict the CPI scores and rankings, the other factors primarily affect them insofar as they relate to the corruption scale. However, the CPI and the rankings, when combined with the four factors, have greater separate effects upon the perceived level of corruption in the society. The paper concludes with two hypotheses to guide further research. The first argues that the national level of corruption perceived by citizens combines a consensus of "top-down" (or elite) and "bottom-up" (or citizen) perceptions; the second argues that the two sets of measures are negotiated by citizens to yield the level of perceived corruption nationally. Either way, the CPI index alone cannot provide global measures and meanings for national corruption.
Defining Corruption
It is a truism in empirical research that one predicts in order to explain. International studies of corruption, however, often demand that we predict in order to define-in this case, to find a suitable definition of corruption that may be useful globally. The introduction notes how most researchers avoid this problem by choosing a working and measurable definition of corruption in order to test which factors predict levels within individual nations or on a global level. Such choices are made based upon careful examinations of the existing literature. This paper takes a step back from such studies, though, and attempts to derive a working global definition of corruption for future research. The goal is not to predict how corruption defined variously may occur; rather, the goal is to explain the variation in corruption across nations.
This project owes much to its predecessors, which present important clues to how one might define the term. Gerring and Thacker define corruption initially as "an act that subverts the public good for private gain" and then refine this definition as "an act by a public official (or with the acquiescence of a public official) that violates legal or social norms for private or particularistic gain".5 While the definition in and of itself sounds much like the ones that suggest ethnocentric bias, it actually opens the door to questions that avoid this trap. What are the legal and social norms of a particular society regarding "proper" behavior by officials or the government? How much power should public officials have relative to private citizens? How does one measure the "public good" in order to decide whether a political actor is even behaving in a manner just to serve their private or particularistic interests? These questions serve as guideposts as this paper examines various factors that citizens might consider in defining corruption on a national or global level.
"Proper Behavior" and Citizen Power
A difficulty in describing "proper behavior" by government officials is the wide global variance in defining elite propriety. Even leaders in democracies have more power to make decisions than citizens, and the demands of such duties as national security and economic stabilization often increase this power differential. Drawing the line between necessary governmental powers and corruption raises serious debates in democratic societies. Adding non-democratic societies in which power differentials are taken as a given may only decrease the chances that one may arrive at a suitable global definition for when the excessive exercise of power signals governmental corruption.
The first step in uncovering corruption must be to explore the variance in power between peoples and their government that the respective citizens consider corrupt.
Providing Services: The "Other Side" of the Definition
Past studies generally assume "corruption" means resources allocated for the public good are diverted by corrupt officials for their private gain. Few studies, however, examine the supply side of the public goods question to test whether citizens perceive that they are being deprived of public goods due to their leaders' actions. The problem here is that it is not often easy to differentiate between a leader's private good and the public goods they are entrusted to supply; for instance, if a public official receives some benefit from the effective provision of employment or healthcare, is that official corrupt? Moreover, how does one distinguish which benefits public officials may legally or morally receive (like votes or campaign volunteers) from those benefits that signal corruption (like bribes or favors from prominent citizens)?6
One response might be that widespread diversion of public funds for private use by officials makes the provision of public goods impossible due to the limits on resources. Further, one would expect the level of provision, not just the existence of such goods, to be one indicator of corruption; if public schools or water treatment are poor even though revenues are collected, citizens could easily assume that public officials are corrupt. Hence, the provision of public goods should also be considered in defining corruption on a global level, including how individual citizens conceptualize "adequate provision."
Factors Affecting the Definition of Corruption: Independent and Dependent Variables
This paper builds upon the matrices of citizen power and service provision to create the indices for modeling a definition of corruption. It factor analyzed fourteen variables in groups representing different measures of these two concepts; the resulting factors, and their loadings, are listed in Table 1 . The indices were created from the separate factors and their loadings. The Citizen Power Scale adds the first two variables' values together and subtracted the third variable's value; the higher the value on this scale the more power citizens felt they had. The Information Scale also adds the first two variables' values and subtracted the third variable's value; the higher the value on this scale, the more informed citizens felt they were. The Governmental Power Scale adds together the three variables' values; the higher the value on this scale, the more power citizens were willing to grant legitimately to the government. Finally, the Service Provision Scale adds the six variables' values; the higher the value on this scale, the more citizens felt they were receiving the governmental services described. The paper used combined two questions to measure citizens' perceived levels of corruption in their government. These questions were:
 Politicians involved in corruption?  Public officials involved in corruption?
When responses to these questions were added together, they formed the Corruption Scale which is the dependent variable in the analysis; the higher one goes on the scale, the less corrupt political leaders are perceived to be.
Individual-Level Results
The four independent variables were fit into a regression equation to test how well they explained how individuals in the entire sample perceived corruption in their respective nations. When the Citizen Power, Information, Governmental Power, and Service Provision scales were entered as independent variables in a forward regression, the following equation resulted7:
.124 Citizen Power + .107 Information + .046 Governmental Power + .268 Service Provision = Corruption Scale R=.400, R2= .160.
From the equation and the standardized betas, it appears that the provision of public goods has the strongest effect upon perceptions of corruption; the better the perception of service allocation, the lower the perception of corruption. However, all four of the measures were positively related to low levels of corruption, indicating that the more powerful citizens felt, the more informed they felt, and the less they accepted Governmental Power over their civil rights, the lower the perception of corruption. The latter three findings are consistent with arguments that democratic values and characteristics are likely to restrain corruption.
An empirical and a theoretical problem remain. Regarding the former, the model only explains 16% of the total variance in citizens' perceptions of corruption. Regarding the latter, this model only deals with what Hill refers to as one of the two important and diverging meanings of world opinion. These are the opinion of states, individually and collectively, and the opinion of people, beyond their national identities… In the world of practical politics there is a good deal of slipping and sliding between these meanings, while behind the distinction lie the further problems of how people do talk about world opinion, and how they might or should talk about it8.
The model so far applies only to the "opinions of people" combined for the entire sample. There are several problems with this approach. First, it is an artificial construct to combine data from several different nations and assume this represents a sample of the entire world. Second, there are issues of weighting, given that the samples from various nations are not proportionate to their populations. Finally, world opinion defines nations as the primary actors in the world opinion process9; as such, the model must be adjusted to address the interpretation of world opinion as the "opinions of nations" and not just individuals.
Mean National-Level Results
Examining the "opinions of nations" regarding world opinion, particularly on attitudes towards corruption, makes intuitive sense. When one wishes to evaluate "world opinion" towards any subject using global polls, the common practice is to examine the marginal frequencies from each nation's sample and make a generalization about the results. For instance, if one wished to measure global attitudes towards a specific nation, one would examine whether majorities in other nations polled had positive or negative evaluations, and then attempt to describe a general pattern regarding the subject nation's international standing. This approach necessarily provides a different perspective from the combined data approach; for instance, the mean Citizen Power value ranges from 1.9 for Venezuela to 5.77 for Croatia. As such, exceptionally high values in a few countries could skew the overall mean for the entire sample, giving a different impression of the meaning of corruption in the world than one would get from examining the marginals themselves. This paper extends the method of examining marginals by replicating the previous analysis, using each of the individual countries in the sample as a separate case, and by calculating mean values for each country for the Citizen Power, Information, Governmental Power, and Service Provision scales, as well as the level of corruption in the country. The results were weighted according to the sample size for each country for the analysis10. The mean values of the Corruption Scale were regressed upon the mean values of the independent variables. The results are shown below.
.092 Citizen Power + .332 Information + .247 Governmental Power + .326 Service Provision = Corruption Scale R=.809, R2= .655.
The equation shares a similarity with the individual-level results-all four variables relate to lower levels of perceived corruption. However, using the means changes the order of the betas from the first equation; here, the Service Provision and Information scales have the greatest effect on defining corruption, followed by the Governmental Power and Citizen Power scales. The most notable difference, though, is the amount of variance explained; the national means explain 65.5% of the variance in the mean national perceptions of corruption. This result suggests that on a global level, the delivery of services and the degree of citizen empowerment are critical factors in how corruption is defined nationally.
Beyond the issue of predication, however, this approach addresses some of the theoretical problems of using the individual-level data. First, the problem of "opinions of people" versus "opinions of nations" is somewhat mitigated by the use of mean values by nation that are based upon the opinions of the individuals in that country. Second, the approach addresses the problem that individual-level data does not represent a sample proportionate to population size; the weighting of cases by sample size pertains to the statistical analysis. Finally, this approach still assumes the nation is the relevant unit of analysis, consistent with the intuitive method of measuring world opinion comparing marginals from different countries.
However, there already exists a global measure for corruption among nations in the world: the Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index" (CPI). Questions therefore arise regarding the relationship between the mean values of the factors above, the mean perceived level of corruption in a society, and the CPI, given that all three are considered global measures.
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Mean Perceived Levels of Corruption in Surveys
The designers of the Corruptions Perceptions Index provide detailed information regarding the methodology used to produce its ratings. In 16 out of 17 cases for the 2011 CPI, for instance, data is provided by financial institutions, world risk experts, and surveys of leading international business executives; only one organization, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, also utilizes surveys of non-elite citizens in its calculations11. Even in this case, however, the index also surveys business elites, and the questions themselves are all variations on whether public officials use their offices for private gain. used. Given its sources, it is fair to say, then, that the CPI is overwhelmingly a measure of "elite" opinions on corruption worldwide, provided primarily by business leaders and policy experts.
These sources beg the question of how the index relates to various nations' citizens' perceptions of corruption in their own country, and the factors this paper have shown predict mean levels of perceived corruption in different nations. The analysis addresses this question by correlating the mean values of the Citizen Power, Information, Governmental Power, and Service Provision scales with the mean Corruption Scales for each nation with the 2006 CPI values and rankings of the same nations12; the results are presented in Table 2 . Table 2 illustrates a number of significant findings regarding these measures. First, all the mean factors that correlate with the Corruption scale are inter-correlated, with the exception of the Citizen Power and Governmental Power measures. Second, the Corruption Scale is highly correlated with the CPI values (r=-.800, p=.000) and the CPI ranking of nations (r =.718, p=.000), indicating that the survey index and the two CPI indexes measure similar things within a nation. Third, all of
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As with the prior analysis, the results were weighted according to the number of respondents in each nation. the factors that correlate with the Corruption Scale also correlate with the CPI and CPI rankings, except for the Citizen Power factor. This final finding raises issues about the nature of the relationship among the CPI and CPI rankings, and the Corruption Scale and associated factors.
There are two models that might explain this relationship. The first argues that the Corruption Scale and the factors associated with it both measure separate things, and hence have separate effects upon the CPI and CPI rankings. The second model inverts the first, and argues that the factors, and the CPI and CPI rankings, have separate effects upon the mean perceptions of corruption in a nation, as measured by the Corruption Scale. In the first model, the CPI and its national rankings represent a measure that encompasses the mean citizen perceptions of corruption in their respective nations. In this case, elite perceptions and citizens perceptions would be essentially equivalent. In the second model, the CPI and its rankings are incomplete measures of the mean level of corruption citizens perceive in their nation, and hence, must be supplemented with the survey-based factors. In this case, elite perceptions would not be equivalent to citizen perceptions, and the relationship between the two that comprises citizens' perceptions of corruption in their nation must be discussed.
Evaluating the Two Models
In order to compare the accuracy of the two models, a series of stepwise regressions was run alternating the dependent variable in accordance with the model. In Model I, the CPI and CPI ranking were the dependent variables, and the four factors and the Corruption Scale were the independent variables. In each case, the first regression used only the Corruption Scale while the second regression included the Corruption Scale and the four factors. The percentage of the variance in the CPI explained by the first regression was 77.5%; this increases to 81.6% when the four factors are added, indicating an improvement of 4.1% over the first regression. Similarly, the percentage of variance in the CPI Ranking explained by the first regression was 50.7%; this increases to 64.5% of the variance when the four factors are added, indicating an improvement of 13.9% over the first regression. The results support Model I since the Corruption Scale and the four factors do have separate and measurable effects upon the CPI and CPI rankings. However, the percentages of variance explained are greater in the second model. In Model II, the Corruption Scale was the dependent variable, and the CPI and CPI Rank, along with the four factors, were the independent variables. The CPI predicted 77.5% of the variance in the Corruption Scale; this increases to 86.9% when the four factors are added, indicating an improvement of 9.9% over the first regression. Similarly, CPI ranking predicted 51.5% of the variance in the Corruption Scale; this increases to 80.6% when the four factors are added, indicating an improvement of 29.1% over the first regression. The equations associated with the second regression are shown below, including the standardized betas13:
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The CPI Corruption Rank in the second equation has a negative beta for the Corruptions Scale because a higher CPI rank shows a higher level of corruption in the society. The results show that in both cases, the CPI measures have the greatest effect upon the Corruption Scale. However, the other factors, with the exception of the Governmental Power scale (which has strong interactive effects with the other independent variables), also have notable effects on the dependent variable.
The results suggest that a good part of the variance in the CPI and the CPI Rank explained by the four factors is due to their correlation with the Corruption Scale. This is less true when one attempts to predict values on the Corruption Scale using the four factors and the CPI and CPI Rank; less of the effect upon the Corruption Scale is due to the correlations between the four factors, and the CPI and the CPI Rank. While Model I has viability, Model II is more robust. Because one would expect that citizens' perceptions would affect the CPI and CPI rankings, the superior viability of Model II raises serious questions about the meaning and bases of the CPI scales and global rankings.
Conclusions: Defining Corruption in the Context of World Opinion
Some of this paper's findings are consistent with previous studies. The more empowered citizens are the less corrupt a nation is perceived to be. This paper added an important element on the supply side of the equation, however-the more adequate service provision is perceived to be, the lower the levels of perceived corruption. On a global level, then, a preliminary definition of corruption must include the inputs and outputs of government: Corruption is the disempowerment of citizens leading to poor provision of public goods by leader caused by leaders' misappropriation of public or private resources. Such a definition does not define specific actions by leaders, but rather assumes a link between the ability of citizens to make demands and the motivation of leaders to fulfill them.
This definition adds the perceptions of non-elites as an important factor in determining the perceived level of corruption in a society. But one must still ask if citizen perceptions are important. In part, that depends upon how one uses the Corruption Perceptions Index; if it is to merely be a measure of primarily elite attitudes based around a specific definition of corruption, one need not be concerned with citizen perceptions. After all, one might argue that the CPI is a measure made by business and governmental elites for business and governmental elites who are seeking investment opportunities in the respective countries. A conversation that occurs primarily among elites may not require the input of citizen attitudes.
But this argument seems of little use in an era of globalized economies. First, it is unrealistic to assume that elites would desire less information on perceived levels of corruption in a society than more, or that they would consider the perceptions of nations' citizens irrelevant. Foreign investment may be primarily an elite exercise, but it occurs within a cultural context partially defined by citizens. Ignoring citizen inputs would therefore be a strong disadvantage in decision-making. Second, if one wishes to define corruption on a global level, one must include some measure of world opinion in that definition. Here again, global survey results become indispensable. Finally, if one wishes to understand the meaning of corruption globally, one needs to assess how citizens "on the ground" perceive this term in their own societies, since in many cases they have the closest view of it.
This discussion necessarily begs the question of how perceptions of corruption come to be formed among citizens in various nations. Exploring these processes opens a fruitful area for further research. Two hypotheses deserve consideration, although others will no doubt be generated. First, the perception of levels of corruption in a given society might arise from a consensus of elites and non-elites within a society, with both drawing upon their experiences with the economic culture. Here the different measures are, for the most part, indicators of the same perceptions, as shown in Model I; certainly, those results suggest that there is a strong correspondence between leaders' and citizens' perceptions of the basic measures that define corruption.
Second, though, the elite measures (which are generated on a global level) and citizen perceptions (which are based on the national level) might predict different average levels of perceived corruption, as shown in Model II. Here, a negotiation might occur in citizens' minds between the global measures provided by elites and the national measures provided by citizens. The result would be the perceived level of corruption in a society. This process would parallel the process of negotiating national identity between a nation's Fremdbild(or external reputation internationally) with its Selbstbild (or the nation's citizens perceptions of themselves)14. Given that the perceived level of corruption in a society might be an important component of how a nation's citizens view their identities, there are sufficient similarities to warrant further investigation.
Defining corruption internationally is not solely an elite or non-elite exercise. It requires inputs from leaders and citizens alike. This paper suggests that world opinion on corruption, even as defined as the "opinions of nations", is not merely a "top-down" process. NGOs and other organizations can provide critical guidelines for defining corruption, but citizen empowerment and state provision of collective goods are also critical components best judged by those most likely to be affected by them. 
